__show_regs() fails to dump the PKRU state when the debug registers are in
their default state because there is a return statement on the debug
register state.

Change the logic to report PKRU value even when debug registers are in
their default state.

Fixes:c0b17b5b ("x86/mm/pkeys: Dump PKRU with other kernel registers")
Signed-off-by: NNicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org>
Acked-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160910183045.4618-1-nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.orgSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

As discussed in the previous patch, there is a reliability
benefit to allowing an init value for the Protection Keys Rights
User register (PKRU) which differs from what the XSAVE hardware
provides.

But, having PKRU be 0 (its init value) provides some nonzero
amount of optimization potential to the hardware.  It can, for
instance, skip writes to the XSAVE buffer when it knows that PKRU
is in its init state.

The cost of losing this optimization is approximately 100 cycles
per context switch for a workload which lightly using XSAVE
state (something not using AVX much).  The overhead comes from a
combinaation of actually manipulating PKRU and the overhead of
pullin in an extra cacheline.

This overhead is not huge, but it's also not something that I
think we should unconditionally inflict on everyone.  So, make it
configurable both at boot-time and from debugfs.

Changes to the debugfs value affect all processes created after
the write to debugfs.
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: mgorman@techsingularity.net
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160729163023.407672D2@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

PKRU is the register that lets you disallow writes or all access to a given
protection key.

The XSAVE hardware defines an "init state" of 0 for PKRU: its most
permissive state, allowing access/writes to everything.  Since we start off
all new processes with the init state, we start all processes off with the
most permissive possible PKRU.

This is unfortunate.  If a thread is clone()'d [1] before a program has
time to set PKRU to a restrictive value, that thread will be able to write
to all data, no matter what pkey is set on it.  This weakens any integrity
guarantees that we want pkeys to provide.

To fix this, we define a very restrictive PKRU to override the
XSAVE-provided value when we create a new FPU context.  We choose a value
that only allows access to pkey 0, which is as restrictive as we can
practically make it.

This does not cause any practical problems with applications using
protection keys because we require them to specify initial permissions for
each key when it is allocated, which override the restrictive default.

In the end, this ensures that threads which do not know how to manage their
own pkey rights can not do damage to data which is pkey-protected.

I would have thought this was a pretty contrived scenario, except that I
heard a bug report from an MPX user who was creating threads in some very
early code before main().  It may be crazy, but folks evidently _do_ it.
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: mgorman@techsingularity.net
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160729163021.F3C25D4A@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

This is all that we need to get the new system calls themselves
working on x86.
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: mgorman@techsingularity.net
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160729163017.E3C06FD2@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

This patch adds two new system calls:

	int pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_access_rights)
	int pkey_free(int pkey);

These implement an "allocator" for the protection keys
themselves, which can be thought of as analogous to the allocator
that the kernel has for file descriptors.  The kernel tracks
which numbers are in use, and only allows operations on keys that
are valid.  A key which was not obtained by pkey_alloc() may not,
for instance, be passed to pkey_mprotect().

These system calls are also very important given the kernel's use
of pkeys to implement execute-only support.  These help ensure
that userspace can never assume that it has control of a key
unless it first asks the kernel.  The kernel does not promise to
preserve PKRU (right register) contents except for allocated
pkeys.

The 'init_access_rights' argument to pkey_alloc() specifies the
rights that will be established for the returned pkey.  For
instance:

	pkey = pkey_alloc(flags, PKEY_DENY_WRITE);

will allocate 'pkey', but also sets the bits in PKRU[1] such that
writing to 'pkey' is already denied.

The kernel does not prevent pkey_free() from successfully freeing
in-use pkeys (those still assigned to a memory range by
pkey_mprotect()).  It would be expensive to implement the checks
for this, so we instead say, "Just don't do it" since sane
software will never do it anyway.

Any piece of userspace calling pkey_alloc() needs to be prepared
for it to fail.  Why?  pkey_alloc() returns the same error code
(ENOSPC) when there are no pkeys and when pkeys are unsupported.
They can be unsupported for a whole host of reasons, so apps must
be prepared for this.  Also, libraries or LD_PRELOADs might steal
keys before an application gets access to them.

This allocation mechanism could be implemented in userspace.
Even if we did it in userspace, we would still need additional
user/kernel interfaces to tell userspace which keys are being
used by the kernel internally (such as for execute-only
mappings).  Having the kernel provide this facility completely
removes the need for these additional interfaces, or having an
implementation of this in userspace at all.

Note that we have to make changes to all of the architectures
that do not use mman-common.h because we use the new
PKEY_DENY_ACCESS/WRITE macros in arch-independent code.

1. PKRU is the Protection Key Rights User register.  It is a
   usermode-accessible register that controls whether writes
   and/or access to each individual pkey is allowed or denied.
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: NMel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160729163015.444FE75F@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Today, mprotect() takes 4 bits of data: PROT_READ/WRITE/EXEC/NONE.
Three of those bits: READ/WRITE/EXEC get translated directly in to
vma->vm_flags by calc_vm_prot_bits().  If a bit is unset in
mprotect()'s 'prot' argument then it must be cleared in vma->vm_flags
during the mprotect() call.

We do this clearing today by first calculating the VMA flags we
want set, then clearing the ones we do not want to inherit from
the original VMA:

	vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key);
	...
	newflags = vm_flags;
	newflags |= (vma->vm_flags & ~(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC));

However, we *also* want to mask off the original VMA's vm_flags in
which we store the protection key.

To do that, this patch adds a new macro:

	ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS

which allows the architecture to specify additional bits that it would
like cleared.  We use that to ensure that the VM_PKEY_BIT* bits get
cleared.
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: NMel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160729163013.E48D6981@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

pkey_mprotect() is just like mprotect, except it also takes a
protection key as an argument.  On systems that do not support
protection keys, it still works, but requires that key=0.
Otherwise it does exactly what mprotect does.

I expect it to get used like this, if you want to guarantee that
any mapping you create can *never* be accessed without the right
protection keys set up.

	int real_prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE;
	pkey = pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DENY_ACCESS);
	ptr = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
	ret = pkey_mprotect(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, real_prot, pkey);

This way, there is *no* window where the mapping is accessible
since it was always either PROT_NONE or had a protection key set
that denied all access.

We settled on 'unsigned long' for the type of the key here.  We
only need 4 bits on x86 today, but I figured that other
architectures might need some more space.

Semantically, we have a bit of a problem if we combine this
syscall with our previously-introduced execute-only support:
What do we do when we mix execute-only pkey use with
pkey_mprotect() use?  For instance:

	pkey_mprotect(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_WRITE, 6); // set pkey=6
	mprotect(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_EXEC);  // set pkey=X_ONLY_PKEY?
	mprotect(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_WRITE); // is pkey=6 again?

To solve that, we make the plain-mprotect()-initiated execute-only
support only apply to VMAs that have the default protection key (0)
set on them.

Proposed semantics:
1. protection key 0 is special and represents the default,
   "unassigned" protection key.  It is always allocated.
2. mprotect() never affects a mapping's pkey_mprotect()-assigned
   protection key. A protection key of 0 (even if set explicitly)
   represents an unassigned protection key.
   2a. mprotect(PROT_EXEC) on a mapping with an assigned protection
       key may or may not result in a mapping with execute-only
       properties.  pkey_mprotect() plus pkey_set() on all threads
       should be used to _guarantee_ execute-only semantics if this
       is not a strong enough semantic.
3. mprotect(PROT_EXEC) may result in an "execute-only" mapping. The
   kernel will internally attempt to allocate and dedicate a
   protection key for the purpose of execute-only mappings.  This
   may not be possible in cases where there are no free protection
   keys available.  It can also happen, of course, in situations
   where there is no hardware support for protection keys.
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: NMel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160729163012.3DDD36C4@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

PF_PK means that a memory access violated the protection key
access restrictions.  It is unconditionally an access_error()
because the permissions set on the VMA don't matter (the PKRU
value overrides it), and we never "resolve" PK faults (like
how a COW can "resolve write fault).
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: NMel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160729163010.DD1FE1ED@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

AMD F12h machines have an erratum which can cause DIV/IDIV to behave
unpredictably. The workaround is to set MSRC001_1029[31] but sometimes
there is no BIOS update containing that workaround so let's do it
ourselves unconditionally. It is simple enough.

[ Borislav: Wrote commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: NEmanuel Czirai <icanrealizeum@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Yaowu Xu <yaowu@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160902053550.18097-1-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Łukasz Daniluk reported that on a RHEL kernel that his machine would lock up
after enabling function tracer. I asked him to bisect the functions within
available_filter_functions, which he did and it came down to three:

  _paravirt_nop(), _paravirt_ident_32() and _paravirt_ident_64()

It was found that this is only an issue when noreplace-paravirt is added
to the kernel command line.

This means that those functions are most likely called within critical
sections of the funtion tracer, and must not be traced.

In newer kenels _paravirt_nop() is defined within gcc asm(), and is no
longer an issue.  But both _paravirt_ident_{32,64}() causes the
following splat when they are traced:

 mm/pgtable-generic.c:33: bad pmd ffff8800d2435150(0000000001d00054)
 mm/pgtable-generic.c:33: bad pmd ffff8800d3624190(0000000001d00070)
 mm/pgtable-generic.c:33: bad pmd ffff8800d36a5110(0000000001d00054)
 mm/pgtable-generic.c:33: bad pmd ffff880118eb1450(0000000001d00054)
 NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 22s! [systemd-journal:469]
 Modules linked in: e1000e
 CPU: 2 PID: 469 Comm: systemd-journal Not tainted 4.6.0-rc4-test+ #513
 Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq Pro 6300 SFF/339A, BIOS K01 v02.05 05/07/2012
 task: ffff880118f740c0 ti: ffff8800d4aec000 task.ti: ffff8800d4aec000
 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81134148>]  [<ffffffff81134148>] queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x118/0x1a0
 RSP: 0018:ffff8800d4aefb90  EFLAGS: 00000246
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88011eb16d40
 RDX: ffffffff82485760 RSI: 000000001f288820 RDI: ffffea0000008030
 RBP: ffff8800d4aefb90 R08: 00000000000c0000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: ffffffff821c8e0e R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880000200fb8
 R13: 00007f7a4e3f7000 R14: ffffea000303f600 R15: ffff8800d4b562e0
 FS:  00007f7a4e3d7840(0000) GS:ffff88011eb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007f7a4e3f7000 CR3: 00000000d3e71000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
 Call Trace:
   _raw_spin_lock+0x27/0x30
   handle_pte_fault+0x13db/0x16b0
   handle_mm_fault+0x312/0x670
   __do_page_fault+0x1b1/0x4e0
   do_page_fault+0x22/0x30
   page_fault+0x28/0x30
   __vfs_read+0x28/0xe0
   vfs_read+0x86/0x130
   SyS_read+0x46/0xa0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xa8
 Code: 12 48 c1 ea 0c 83 e8 01 83 e2 30 48 98 48 81 c2 40 6d 01 00 48 03 14 c5 80 6a 5d 82 48 89 0a 8b 41 08 85 c0 75 09 f3 90 8b 41 08 <85> c0 74 f7 4c 8b 09 4d 85 c9 74 08 41 0f 18 09 eb 02 f3 90 8b
Reported-by: NŁukasz Daniluk <lukasz.daniluk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Changes to make the resume from cpu_suspend() code behave more like
secondary boot caused debug exceptions to be unmasked early by
__cpu_setup(). We then go on to restore mdscr_el1 in cpu_do_resume(),
potentially taking break or watch points based on uninitialised registers.

Mask debug exceptions in cpu_do_resume(), which is specific to resume
from cpu_suspend(). Debug exceptions will be restored to their original
state by local_dbg_restore() in cpu_suspend(), which runs after
hw_breakpoint_restore() has re-initialised the other registers.
Reported-by: NLorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Fixes: cabe1c81 ("arm64: Change cpu_resume() to enable mmu early then access sleep_sp by va")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.7+
Signed-off-by: NJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Using "make tinyconfig" produces a couple of annoying warnings that show
up for build test machines all the time:

    .config:966:warning: override: NOHIGHMEM changes choice state
    .config:965:warning: override: SLOB changes choice state
    .config:963:warning: override: KERNEL_XZ changes choice state
    .config:962:warning: override: CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE changes choice state
    .config:933:warning: override: SLOB changes choice state
    .config:930:warning: override: CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE changes choice state
    .config:870:warning: override: SLOB changes choice state
    .config:868:warning: override: KERNEL_XZ changes choice state
    .config:867:warning: override: CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE changes choice state

I've made a previous attempt at fixing them and we discussed a number of
alternatives.

I tried changing the Makefile to use "merge_config.sh -n
$(fragment-list)" but couldn't get that to work properly.

This is yet another approach, based on the observation that we do want
to see a warning for conflicting 'choice' options, and that we can
simply make them non-conflicting by listing all other options as
disabled.  This is a trivial patch that we can apply independent of
plans for other changes.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160829214952.1334674-2-arnd@arndb.de
Link: https://storage.kernelci.org/mainline/v4.7-rc6/x86-tinyconfig/build.log
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9212749/Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: NJosh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Reviewed-by: NMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

There are three usercopy warnings which are currently being silenced for
gcc 4.6 and newer:

1) "copy_from_user() buffer size is too small" compile warning/error

   This is a static warning which happens when object size and copy size
   are both const, and copy size > object size.  I didn't see any false
   positives for this one.  So the function warning attribute seems to
   be working fine here.

   Note this scenario is always a bug and so I think it should be
   changed to *always* be an error, regardless of
   CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS.

2) "copy_from_user() buffer size is not provably correct" compile warning

   This is another static warning which happens when I enable
   __compiletime_object_size() for new compilers (and
   CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS).  It happens when object size
   is const, but copy size is *not*.  In this case there's no way to
   compare the two at build time, so it gives the warning.  (Note the
   warning is a byproduct of the fact that gcc has no way of knowing
   whether the overflow function will be called, so the call isn't dead
   code and the warning attribute is activated.)

   So this warning seems to only indicate "this is an unusual pattern,
   maybe you should check it out" rather than "this is a bug".

   I get 102(!) of these warnings with allyesconfig and the
   __compiletime_object_size() gcc check removed.  I don't know if there
   are any real bugs hiding in there, but from looking at a small
   sample, I didn't see any.  According to Kees, it does sometimes find
   real bugs.  But the false positive rate seems high.

3) "Buffer overflow detected" runtime warning

   This is a runtime warning where object size is const, and copy size >
   object size.

All three warnings (both static and runtime) were completely disabled
for gcc 4.6 with the following commit:

  2fb0815c ("gcc4: disable __compiletime_object_size for GCC 4.6+")

That commit mistakenly assumed that the false positives were caused by a
gcc bug in __compiletime_object_size().  But in fact,
__compiletime_object_size() seems to be working fine.  The false
positives were instead triggered by #2 above.  (Though I don't have an
explanation for why the warnings supposedly only started showing up in
gcc 4.6.)

So remove warning #2 to get rid of all the false positives, and re-enable
warnings #1 and #3 by reverting the above commit.

Furthermore, since #1 is a real bug which is detected at compile time,
upgrade it to always be an error.

Having done all that, CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS is no longer
needed.
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Commit b70661c7 ("net: smc91x: use run-time configuration on all ARM
machines") broke some ARM platforms through several mistakes.  Firstly,
the access size must correspond to the following rule:

(a) at least one of 16-bit or 8-bit access size must be supported
(b) 32-bit accesses are optional, and may be enabled in addition to
    the above.

Secondly, it provides no emulation of 16-bit accesses, instead blindly
making 16-bit accesses even when the platform specifies that only 8-bit
is supported.

Reorganise smc91x.h so we can make use of the existing 16-bit access
emulation already provided - if 16-bit accesses are supported, use
16-bit accesses directly, otherwise if 8-bit accesses are supported,
use the provided 16-bit access emulation.  If neither, BUG().  This
exactly reflects the driver behaviour prior to the commit being fixed.

Since the conversion incorrectly cut down the available access sizes on
several platforms, we also need to go through every platform and fix up
the overly-restrictive access size: Arnd assumed that if a platform can
perform 32-bit, 16-bit and 8-bit accesses, then only a 32-bit access
size needed to be specified - not so, all available access sizes must
be specified.

This likely fixes some performance regressions in doing this: if a
platform does not support 8-bit accesses, 8-bit accesses have been
emulated by performing a 16-bit read-modify-write access.

Tested on the Intel Assabet/Neponset platform, which supports only 8-bit
accesses, which was broken by the original commit.

Fixes: b70661c7 ("net: smc91x: use run-time configuration on all ARM machines")
Signed-off-by: NRussell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Tested-by: NRobert Jarzmik <robert.jarzmik@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Userspace can begin and suspend a transaction within the signal
handler which means they might enter sys_rt_sigreturn() with the
processor in suspended state.

sys_rt_sigreturn() wants to restore process context (which may have
been in a transaction before signal delivery). To do this it must
restore TM SPRS. To achieve this, any transaction initiated within the
signal frame must be discarded in order to be able to restore TM SPRs
as TM SPRs can only be manipulated non-transactionally..
>From the PowerPC ISA:
  TM Bad Thing Exception [Category: Transactional Memory]
   An attempt is made to execute a mtspr targeting a TM register in
   other than Non-transactional state.

Not doing so results in a TM Bad Thing:
[12045.221359] Kernel BUG at c000000000050a40 [verbose debug info unavailable]
[12045.221470] Unexpected TM Bad Thing exception at c000000000050a40 (msr 0x201033)
[12045.221540] Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [#1]
[12045.221586] SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
[12045.221634] Modules linked in: xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle ipt_MASQUERADE
 nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4
 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 xt_tcpudp bridge stp llc ebtable_filter
 ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables kvm_hv kvm
 uio_pdrv_genirq ipmi_powernv uio powernv_rng ipmi_msghandler autofs4 ses enclosure
 scsi_transport_sas bnx2x ipr mdio libcrc32c
[12045.222167] CPU: 68 PID: 6178 Comm: sigreturnpanic Not tainted 4.7.0 #34
[12045.222224] task: c0000000fce38600 ti: c0000000fceb4000 task.ti: c0000000fceb4000
[12045.222293] NIP: c000000000050a40 LR: c0000000000163bc CTR: 0000000000000000
[12045.222361] REGS: c0000000fceb7ac0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted (4.7.0)
[12045.222418] MSR: 9000000300201033 <SF,HV,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE,TM[SE]> CR: 28444280  XER: 20000000
[12045.222625] CFAR: c0000000000163b8 SOFTE: 0 PACATMSCRATCH: 900000014280f033
GPR00: 01100000b8000001 c0000000fceb7d40 c00000000139c100 c0000000fce390d0
GPR04: 900000034280f033 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR08: 0000000000000000 b000000000001033 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
GPR12: 0000000000000000 c000000002926400 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR24: 0000000000000000 00003ffff98cadd0 00003ffff98cb470 0000000000000000
GPR28: 900000034280f033 c0000000fceb7ea0 0000000000000001 c0000000fce390d0
[12045.223535] NIP [c000000000050a40] tm_restore_sprs+0xc/0x1c
[12045.223584] LR [c0000000000163bc] tm_recheckpoint+0x5c/0xa0
[12045.223630] Call Trace:
[12045.223655] [c0000000fceb7d80] [c000000000026e74] sys_rt_sigreturn+0x494/0x6c0
[12045.223738] [c0000000fceb7e30] [c0000000000092e0] system_call+0x38/0x108
[12045.223806] Instruction dump:
[12045.223841] 7c800164 4e800020 7c0022a6 f80304a8 7c0222a6 f80304b0 7c0122a6 f80304b8
[12045.223955] 4e800020 e80304a8 7c0023a6 e80304b0 <7c0223a6> e80304b8 7c0123a6 4e800020
[12045.224074] ---[ end trace cb8002ee240bae76 ]---

It isn't clear exactly if there is really a use case for userspace
returning with a suspended transaction, however, doing so doesn't (on
its own) constitute a bad frame. As such, this patch simply discards
the transactional state of the context calling the sigreturn and
continues.
Reported-by: NLaurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NCyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Tested-by: NLaurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NLaurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NSimon Guo <wei.guo.simon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>

In a situation, where Linux kernel gets notified about duplicate error log
from OPAL, it is been observed that kernel fails to remove sysfs entries
(/sys/firmware/opal/elog/0xXXXXXXXX) of such error logs. This is because,
we currently search the error log/dump kobject in the kset list via
'kset_find_obj()' routine. Which eventually increment the reference count
by one, once it founds the kobject.

So, unless we decrement the reference count by one after it found the kobject,
we would not be able to release the kobject properly later.

This patch adds the 'kobject_put()' which was missing earlier.
Signed-off-by: NMukesh Ojha <mukesh02@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NVasant Hegde <hegdevasant@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>

tabort_syscall runs with RI=1, so a nested recoverable machine
check will load the paca into r13 and overwrite what we loaded
it with, because exceptions returning to privileged mode do not
restore r13.

Fixes: b4b56f9e (powerpc/tm: Abort syscalls in active transactions)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>

Commit 97f2645f ("tree-wide: replace config_enabled() with
IS_ENABLED()") mostly killed config_enabled(), but some new users have
appeared for v4.8-rc1.  They are all used for a boolean option, so can
be replaced with IS_ENABLED() safely.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1471970749-24867-1-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.comSigned-off-by: NMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NPeter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

When CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is selected, we modify the page tables to remap the
kernel at a newly-chosen VA range. We do this with the MMU disabled, but do not
invalidate TLBs prior to re-enabling the MMU with the new tables. Thus the old
mappings entries may still live in TLBs, and we risk violating
Break-Before-Make requirements, leading to TLB conflicts and/or other issues.

We invalidate TLBs when we uninsall the idmap in early setup code, but prior to
this we are subject to issues relating to the Break-Before-Make violation.

Avoid these issues by invalidating the TLBs before the new mappings can be
used by the hardware.

Fixes: f80fb3a3 ("arm64: add support for kernel ASLR")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.6+
Acked-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

We pass xen_vcpu_id mapping information to hypercalls which require
uint32_t type so it would be cleaner to have it as uint32_t. The
initializer to -1 can be dropped as we always do the mapping before using
it and we never check the 'not set' value anyway.
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>

native_smp_prepare_cpus
  -> default_setup_apic_routing
    -> enable_IR_x2apic
      -> irq_remapping_prepare
        -> intel_prepare_irq_remapping
          -> intel_setup_irq_remapping		  

So IR table is setup even if "noapic" boot parameter is added. As a result we
crash later when the interrupt affinity is set due to a half initialized
remapping infrastructure.

Prevent remap initialization when IOAPIC is disabled.
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1471954039-3942-1-git-send-email-wanpeng.li@hotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

We can't initialize the list head on deletion as this causes the node to
point to itself, which causes an infinite loop if vmd_irq() happens to be
servicing that node.

The list initialization was trying to fix a bug from multiple calls to
disable the same IRQ.  Fix this instead by having the VMD driver track if
the interrupt is enabled.

[bhelgaas: changelog, add "Fixes"]
Fixes: 97e92306 ("x86/PCI: VMD: Initialize list item in IRQ disable")
Reported-by: NGrzegorz Koczot <grzegorz.koczot@intel.com>
Tested-by: NMiroslaw Drost <miroslaw.drost@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NKeith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NBjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by Jon Derrick: <jonathan.derrick@intel.com>

Commit e41f501d ("vmlinux.lds: account for destructor sections")
added '.text.exit' to EXIT_TEXT which is discarded at link time by default.
This breaks compilation of UML:
     `.text.exit' referenced in section `.fini_array' of
     /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-linux-gnu/6/../../../x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.a(sdlerror.o):
     defined in discarded section `.text.exit' of
     /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-linux-gnu/6/../../../x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.a(sdlerror.o)

Apparently UML doesn't want to discard exit text, so let's place all EXIT_TEXT
sections in .exit.text.

Fixes: e41f501d ("vmlinux.lds: account for destructor sections")
Reported-by: NStefan Traby <stefan@hello-penguin.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NRichard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>

SARADC controller needs to be reset before programming it, otherwise
it will not function properly.
Signed-off-by: NCaesar Wang <wxt@rock-chips.com>
Acked-by: NHeiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>

SARADC controller needs to be reset before programming it, otherwise
it will not function properly.
Signed-off-by: NCaesar Wang <wxt@rock-chips.com>
Acked-by: NHeiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>

hmi.c functions are unused unless sibling_subcore_state is nonzero, and
that in turn happens only if KVM is in use.  So move the code to
arch/powerpc/kvm/, putting it under CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
rather than CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64.  The sibling_subcore_state is also
included in struct paca_struct only if KVM is supported by the kernel.

Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: kvm-ppc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>

of_mm_gpiochip_add_data() calls mm_gc->save_regs() before
setting the data. Therefore ->save_regs() cannot use
gpiochip_get_data()

[    0.275940] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000130
[    0.283120] Faulting instruction address: 0xc01b44cc
[    0.288175] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
[    0.293343] PREEMPT CMPC885
[    0.296141] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.7.0-g65124df-dirty #68
[    0.304131] task: c6074000 ti: c6080000 task.ti: c6080000
[    0.309459] NIP: c01b44cc LR: c0011720 CTR: c0011708
[    0.314372] REGS: c6081d90 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (4.7.0-g65124df-dirty)
[    0.322267] MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI>  CR: 24000028  XER: 20000000
[    0.328813] DAR: 00000130 DSISR: c0000000
GPR00: c01b6d0c c6081e40 c6074000 c6017000 c9028000 c601d028 c6081dd8 00000000
GPR08: c601d028 00000000 ffffffff 00000001 24000044 00000000 c0002790 00000000
GPR16: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 c05643b0 00000083
GPR24: c04a1a6c c0560000 c04a8308 c04c6480 c0012498 c6017000 c7ffcc78 c6017000
[    0.360806] NIP [c01b44cc] gpiochip_get_data+0x4/0xc
[    0.365684] LR [c0011720] cpm1_gpio16_save_regs+0x18/0x44
[    0.370972] Call Trace:
[    0.373451] [c6081e50] [c01b6d0c] of_mm_gpiochip_add_data+0x70/0xdc
[    0.379624] [c6081e70] [c00124c0] cpm_init_par_io+0x28/0x118
[    0.385238] [c6081e80] [c04a8ac0] do_one_initcall+0xb0/0x17c
[    0.390819] [c6081ef0] [c04a8cbc] kernel_init_freeable+0x130/0x1dc
[    0.396924] [c6081f30] [c00027a4] kernel_init+0x14/0x110
[    0.402177] [c6081f40] [c000b424] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
[    0.408233] Instruction dump:
[    0.411168] 4182fafc 3f80c040 48234c6d 3bc0fff0 3b9c5ed0 4bfffaf4 81290020 712a0004
[    0.418825] 4182fb34 48234c51 4bfffb2c 81230004 <80690130> 4e800020 7c0802a6 9421ffe0
[    0.426763] ---[ end trace fe4113ee21d72ffa ]---

fixes: e65078f1 ("powerpc: sysdev: cpm1: use gpiochip data pointer")
fixes: a14a2d48 ("powerpc: cpm_common: use gpiochip data pointer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NChristophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Reviewed-by: NLinus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>

MCE must not enable MSR_RI until PACA_EXMC is no longer being used.
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>

MCE must not use PACA_EXGEN. When a general exception enables MSR_RI,
that means SPRN_SRR[01] and SPRN_SPRG are no longer used. However the
PACA save area is still in use.
Acked-by: NMahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>

When booting from an OpenFirmware which supports it, we use the
"ibm,client-architecture-support" firmware call to communicate
our capabilities to firmware.

The format of the structure we pass to firmware is specified in
PAPR (Power Architecture Platform Requirements), or the public version
LoPAPR (Linux on Power Architecture Platform Reference).

Referring to table 244 in LoPAPR v1.1, option vector 5 contains a 4 byte
field at bytes 17-20 for the "Platform Facilities Enable". This is
followed by a 1 byte field at byte 21 for "Sub-Processor Represenation
Level".

Comparing to the code, there we have the Platform Facilities
options (OV5_PFO_*) at byte 17, but we fail to pad that field out to its
full width of 4 bytes. This means the OV5_SUB_PROCESSORS option is
incorrectly placed at byte 18.

Fix it by adding zero bytes for bytes 18, 19, 20, and comment the bytes
to hopefully make it clearer in future.

As far as I'm aware nothing actually consumes this value at this time,
so the effect of this bug is nil in practice.

It does mean we've been incorrectly setting bit 15 of the "Platform
Facilities Enable" option for the past ~3 1/2 years, so we should avoid
allocating that bit to anything else in future.

Fixes: df77c799 ("powerpc/pseries: Update ibm,architecture.vec for PAPR 2.7/POWER8")
Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>

We observed a kernel oops when running a PPC guest with config NR_CPUS=4
and qemu option "-smp cores=1,threads=8":

[   30.634781] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at
address 0xc00000014192eb17
[   30.636173] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000003e5cc
[   30.637069] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
[   30.637877] SMP NR_CPUS=4 NUMA pSeries
[   30.638471] Modules linked in:
[   30.638949] CPU: 3 PID: 27 Comm: migration/3 Not tainted
4.7.0-07963-g9714b26 #1
[   30.640059] task: c00000001e29c600 task.stack: c00000001e2a8000
[   30.640956] NIP: c00000000003e5cc LR: c00000000003e550 CTR:
0000000000000000
[   30.642001] REGS: c00000001e2ab8e0 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted
(4.7.0-07963-g9714b26)
[   30.643139] MSR: 8000000102803033 <SF,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE,TM[E]>  CR: 22004084  XER: 00000000
[   30.644583] CFAR: c000000000009e98 DAR: c00000014192eb17 DSISR: 40000000 SOFTE: 0
GPR00: c00000000140a6b8 c00000001e2abb60 c0000000016dd300 0000000000000003
GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000004 c0000000016e5920 0000000000000008
GPR08: 0000000000000004 c00000014192eb17 0000000000000000 0000000000000020
GPR12: c00000000140a6c0 c00000000ffffc00 c0000000000d3ea8 c00000001e005680
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR20: 0000000000000000 c00000001e6b3a00 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
GPR24: c00000001ff85138 c00000001ff85130 000000001eb6f000 0000000000000001
GPR28: 0000000000000000 c0000000017014e0 0000000000000000 0000000000000018
[   30.653882] NIP [c00000000003e5cc] __cpu_disable+0xcc/0x190
[   30.654713] LR [c00000000003e550] __cpu_disable+0x50/0x190
[   30.655528] Call Trace:
[   30.655893] [c00000001e2abb60] [c00000000003e550] __cpu_disable+0x50/0x190 (unreliable)
[   30.657280] [c00000001e2abbb0] [c0000000000aca0c] take_cpu_down+0x5c/0x100
[   30.658365] [c00000001e2abc10] [c000000000163918] multi_cpu_stop+0x1a8/0x1e0
[   30.659617] [c00000001e2abc60] [c000000000163cc0] cpu_stopper_thread+0xf0/0x1d0
[   30.660737] [c00000001e2abd20] [c0000000000d8d70] smpboot_thread_fn+0x290/0x2a0
[   30.661879] [c00000001e2abd80] [c0000000000d3fa8] kthread+0x108/0x130
[   30.662876] [c00000001e2abe30] [c000000000009968] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x74
[   30.664017] Instruction dump:
[   30.664477] 7bde1f24 38a00000 787f1f24 3b600001 39890008 7d204b78 7d05e214 7d0b07b4
[   30.665642] 796b1f24 7d26582a 7d204a14 7d29f214 <7d4048a8> 7d4a3878 7d4049ad 40c2fff4
[   30.666854] ---[ end trace 32643b7195717741 ]---

The reason of this is that in __cpu_disable(), when we try to set the
cpu_sibling_mask or cpu_core_mask of the sibling CPUs of the disabled
one, we don't check whether the current configuration employs those
sibling CPUs(hw threads). And if a CPU is not employed by a
configuration, the percpu structures cpu_{sibling,core}_mask are not
allocated, therefore accessing those cpumasks will result in problems as
above.

This patch fixes this problem by adding an addition check on whether the
id is no less than nr_cpu_ids in the sibling CPU iteration code.
Signed-off-by: NBoqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>

These files were only including module.h for exception table
related functions.  We've now separated that content out into its
own file "extable.h" so now move over to that and avoid all the
extra header content in module.h that we don't really need to compile
these files.

Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>

Unsigned type is always non-negative, so the loop could not end in case
condition is never true.

The problem has been detected using semantic patch
scripts/coccinelle/tests/unsigned_lesser_than_zero.cocci
Signed-off-by: NAndrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>

This patch leverages 'struct pci_host_bridge' from the PCI subsystem
in order to free the pci_controller only after the last reference to
its devices is dropped (avoiding an oops in pcibios_release_device()
if the last reference is dropped after pcibios_free_controller()).

The patch relies on pci_host_bridge.release_fn() (and .release_data),
which is called automatically by the PCI subsystem when the root bus
is released (i.e., the last reference is dropped).  Those fields are
set via pci_set_host_bridge_release() (e.g. in the platform-specific
implementation of pcibios_root_bridge_prepare()).

It introduces the 'pcibios_free_controller_deferred()' .release_fn()
and it expects .release_data to hold a pointer to the pci_controller.

The function implictly calls 'pcibios_free_controller()', so an user
must *NOT* explicitly call it if using the new _deferred() callback.

The functionality is enabled for pseries (although it isn't platform
specific, and may be used by cxl).

Details on not-so-elegant design choices:

 - Use 'pci_host_bridge.release_data' field as pointer to associated
   'struct pci_controller' so *not* to 'pci_bus_to_host(bridge->bus)'
   in pcibios_free_controller_deferred().

   That's because pci_remove_root_bus() sets 'host_bridge->bus = NULL'
   (so, if the last reference is released after pci_remove_root_bus()
   runs, which eventually reaches pcibios_free_controller_deferred(),
   that would hit a null pointer dereference).

   The cxl/vphb.c code calls pci_remove_root_bus(), and the cxl folks
   are interested in this fix.

Test-case #1 (hold references)

  # ls -ld /sys/block/sd* | grep -m1 0021:01:00.0
  <...> /sys/block/sdaa -> ../devices/pci0021:01/0021:01:00.0/<...>

  # ls -ld /sys/block/sd* | grep -m1 0021:01:00.1
  <...> /sys/block/sdab -> ../devices/pci0021:01/0021:01:00.1/<...>

  # cat >/dev/sdaa & pid1=$!
  # cat >/dev/sdab & pid2=$!

  # drmgr -w 5 -d 1 -c phb -s 'PHB 33' -r
  Validating PHB DLPAR capability...yes.
  [  594.306719] pci_hp_remove_devices: PCI: Removing devices on bus 0021:01
  [  594.306738] pci_hp_remove_devices:    Removing 0021:01:00.0...
  ...
  [  598.236381] pci_hp_remove_devices:    Removing 0021:01:00.1...
  ...
  [  611.972077] pci_bus 0021:01: busn_res: [bus 01-ff] is released
  [  611.972140] rpadlpar_io: slot PHB 33 removed

  # kill -9 $pid1
  # kill -9 $pid2
  [  632.918088] pcibios_free_controller_deferred: domain 33, dynamic 1

Test-case #2 (don't hold references)

  # drmgr -w 5 -d 1 -c phb -s 'PHB 33' -r
  Validating PHB DLPAR capability...yes.
  [  916.357363] pci_hp_remove_devices: PCI: Removing devices on bus 0021:01
  [  916.357386] pci_hp_remove_devices:    Removing 0021:01:00.0...
  ...
  [  920.566527] pci_hp_remove_devices:    Removing 0021:01:00.1...
  ...
  [  933.955873] pci_bus 0021:01: busn_res: [bus 01-ff] is released
  [  933.955977] pcibios_free_controller_deferred: domain 33, dynamic 1
  [  933.955999] rpadlpar_io: slot PHB 33 removed
Suggested-By: NGavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NGavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> # cxl
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>

The field "owner" is set by the core.
Thus delete an unneeded initialisation.

Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/platform_no_drv_owner.cocci
Signed-off-by: NMarkus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>

The field "owner" is set by the core.
Thus delete an unneeded initialisation.

Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/platform_no_drv_owner.cocci
Signed-off-by: NMarkus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>

Powerpc builds may fail with the following build error.

Error log:
In file included from ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h:11:0,
                 from ./include/linux/mmu_context.h:4,
		 from mm/mmu_context.c:8:
./arch/powerpc/include/asm/cputhreads.h: In function 'get_tensr':
./arch/powerpc/include/asm/cputhreads.h:101:2: error:
	implicit declaration of function 'cpu_has_feature'

The problem can be triggered by configuring ppc64e_defconfig and selecting
CONFIG_TICK_CPU_ACCOUNTING instead of CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_NATIVE.

Fixes: b92a226e ("powerpc: Move cpu_has_feature() to a separate file")
Signed-off-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>

When building gccgo in userspace, errno.h gets parsed and the go include file
sysinfo.go is generated.

Since EREFUSED is defined to the same value as ECONNREFUSED, and ECONNREFUSED
is defined later on in errno.h, this leads to go complaining that EREFUSED
isn't defined yet.

Fix this trivial problem by moving the define of EREFUSED down after
ECONNREFUSED in errno.h (and clean up the indenting while touching this line).
Signed-off-by: NHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Commit 54b66800 (parisc: Add native high-resolution sched_clock()
implementation) added support to use the CPU-internal cr16 counters as reliable
clocksource with the help of HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK.

Sadly the commit missed to remove the hack which prevented cr16 to become the
default clocksource even on SMP systems.
Signed-off-by: NHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.7+

Some module using div_u64() was failing to link because the libgcc 64-bit
divide assist routine was not being exported for modules

Reported-by: avinashp@quantenna.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NVineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>