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  1. 10 4月, 2008 1 次提交
    • D
      [IPV4]: Fix byte value boundary check in do_ip_getsockopt(). · 951e07c9
      由 David S. Miller 提交于 
      This fixes kernel bugzilla 10371.

As reported by M.Piechaczek@osmosys.tv, if we try to grab a
char sized socket option value, as in:

  unsigned char ttl = 255;
  socklen_t     len = sizeof(ttl);
  setsockopt(socket, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_TTL, &ttl, &len);

  getsockopt(socket, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_TTL, &ttl, &len);

The ttl returned will be wrong on big-endian, and on both little-
endian and big-endian the next three bytes in userspace are written
with garbage.

It's because of this test in do_ip_getsockopt():

	if (len < sizeof(int) && len > 0 && val>=0 && val<255) {

It should allow a 'val' of 255 to pass here, but it doesn't so it
copies a full 'int' back to userspace.

On little-endian that will write the correct value into the location
but it spams on the next three bytes in userspace.  On big endian it
writes the wrong value into the location and spams the next three
bytes.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      951e07c9
  3. 26 3月, 2008 1 次提交
  5. 25 3月, 2008 3 次提交
  7. 18 3月, 2008 1 次提交
  9. 06 3月, 2008 1 次提交
  11. 13 2月, 2008 1 次提交
    • D
      [IPV4]: Remove IP_TOS setting privilege checks. · e4f8b5d4
      由 David S. Miller 提交于 
      Various RFCs have all sorts of things to say about the CS field of the
DSCP value.  In particular they try to make the distinction between
values that should be used by "user applications" and things like
routing daemons.

This seems to have influenced the CAP_NET_ADMIN check which exists for
IP_TOS socket option settings, but in fact it has an off-by-one error
so it wasn't allowing CS5 which is meant for "user applications" as
well.

Further adding to the inconsistency and brokenness here, IPV6 does not
validate the DSCP values specified for the IPV6_TCLASS socket option.

The real actual uses of these TOS values are system specific in the
final analysis, and these RFC recommendations are just that, "a
recommendation".  In fact the standards very purposefully use
"SHOULD" and "SHOULD NOT" when describing how these values can be
used.

In the final analysis the only clean way to provide consistency here
is to remove the CAP_NET_ADMIN check.  The alternatives just don't
work out:

1) If we add the CAP_NET_ADMIN check to ipv6, this can break existing
   setups.

2) If we just fix the off-by-one error in the class comparison in
   IPV4, certain DSCP values can be used in IPV6 but not IPV4 by
   default.  So people will just ask for a sysctl asking to
   override that.

I checked several other freely available kernel trees and they
do not make any privilege checks in this area like we do.  For
the BSD stacks, this goes back all the way to Stevens Volume 2
and beyond.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e4f8b5d4
  13. 29 1月, 2008 1 次提交
  15. 07 11月, 2007 1 次提交
  17. 11 10月, 2007 2 次提交
    • S
      [NET]: sparse warning fixes · cfcabdcc
      由 Stephen Hemminger 提交于 
      Fix a bunch of sparse warnings. Mostly about 0 used as
NULL pointer, and shadowed variable declarations.
One notable case was that hash size should have been unsigned.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      cfcabdcc
    • E
      [NET]: Make the device list and device lookups per namespace. · 881d966b
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      This patch makes most of the generic device layer network
namespace safe.  This patch makes dev_base_head a
network namespace variable, and then it picks up
a few associated variables.  The functions:
dev_getbyhwaddr
dev_getfirsthwbytype
dev_get_by_flags
dev_get_by_name
__dev_get_by_name
dev_get_by_index
__dev_get_by_index
dev_ioctl
dev_ethtool
dev_load
wireless_process_ioctl

were modified to take a network namespace argument, and
deal with it.

vlan_ioctl_set and brioctl_set were modified so their
hooks will receive a network namespace argument.

So basically anthing in the core of the network stack that was
affected to by the change of dev_base was modified to handle
multiple network namespaces.  The rest of the network stack was
simply modified to explicitly use &init_net the initial network
namespace.  This can be fixed when those components of the network
stack are modified to handle multiple network namespaces.

For now the ifindex generator is left global.

Fundametally ifindex numbers are per namespace, or else
we will have corner case problems with migration when
we get that far.

At the same time there are assumptions in the network stack
that the ifindex of a network device won't change.  Making
the ifindex number global seems a good compromise until
the network stack can cope with ifindex changes when
you change namespaces, and the like.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      881d966b
  19. 27 8月, 2007 1 次提交
  21. 26 4月, 2007 8 次提交
  23. 15 2月, 2007 1 次提交
    • T
      [PATCH] remove many unneeded #includes of sched.h · cd354f1a
      由 Tim Schmielau 提交于 
      After Al Viro (finally) succeeded in removing the sched.h #include in module.h
recently, it makes sense again to remove other superfluous sched.h includes.
There are quite a lot of files which include it but don't actually need
anything defined in there.  Presumably these includes were once needed for
macros that used to live in sched.h, but moved to other header files in the
course of cleaning it up.

To ease the pain, this time I did not fiddle with any header files and only
removed #includes from .c-files, which tend to cause less trouble.

Compile tested against 2.6.20-rc2 and 2.6.20-rc2-mm2 (with offsets) on alpha,
arm, i386, ia64, mips, powerpc, and x86_64 with allnoconfig, defconfig,
allmodconfig, and allyesconfig as well as a few randconfigs on x86_64 and all
configs in arch/arm/configs on arm.  I also checked that no new warnings were
introduced by the patch (actually, some warnings are removed that were emitted
by unnecessarily included header files).
Signed-off-by: NTim Schmielau <tim@physik3.uni-rostock.de>
Acked-by: NRussell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      cd354f1a
  25. 11 2月, 2007 1 次提交
  27. 03 12月, 2006 1 次提交
  29. 29 9月, 2006 3 次提交
  31. 03 8月, 2006 1 次提交
    • C
      [AF_UNIX]: Kernel memory leak fix for af_unix datagram getpeersec patch · dc49c1f9
      由 Catherine Zhang 提交于 
      From: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>

This patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the
original unix datagram getpeersec patch.  Instead of creating a
security context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the
security context when the receiver requests it.

This new design requires modification of the current
unix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely,
secid_to_secctx and release_secctx.  The former retrieves the security
context and the latter releases it.  A hook is required for releasing
the security context because it is up to the security module to decide
how that's done.  In the case of Selinux, it's a simple kfree
operation.
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      dc49c1f9
  33. 01 7月, 2006 1 次提交
  35. 21 3月, 2006 3 次提交
    • A
      [NET]: Identation & other cleanups related to compat_[gs]etsockopt cset · 543d9cfe
      由 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 提交于 
      No code changes, just tidying up, in some cases moving EXPORT_SYMBOLs
to just after the function exported, etc.
Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      543d9cfe
    • D
      [NET]: {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer · 3fdadf7d
      由 Dmitry Mishin 提交于 
      This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to
move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal
net/compat.c file in the future.
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      3fdadf7d
    • C
      [SECURITY]: TCP/UDP getpeersec · 2c7946a7
      由 Catherine Zhang 提交于 
      This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking
controls whereby an application can determine the label of the
security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to
via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.

Patch purpose:

This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or
UDP socket is using.  The application can then use this security
context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of
the peer at the other end of this connection.  In the case of UDP, the
security context is for each individual packet.  An example
application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start
daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client.

Patch design approach:

- Design for TCP
The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for
a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security
association.  The application may retrieve this context using
getsockopt.  When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a
connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry
cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations.  If a
security association has a security context, the context string is
returned, as for UNIX domain sockets.

- Design for UDP
Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless.  This requires a somewhat different
API to retrieve the peer security context.  With TCP, the peer
security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can
be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established
and when it is torn down.  With UDP, each read/write can have
different peer and thus the security context might change every time.
As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with
the packet retrieval.

The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials.  Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message).

Patch implementation details:

- Implementation for TCP
The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt
with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag.  As an example (ignoring error
checking):

getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen);
printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf);

The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check
for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED ==
sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only.  If so, the socket has a dst_cache of
struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations.  If
these have security associations with security contexts, the security
context is returned.

getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or
the buffer is unmodified.

- Implementation for UDP
To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to
the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via
getsockopt.  Then the application retrieves the security context using
the auxiliary data mechanism.

An example server application for UDP should look like this:

toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);

setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
    cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
    if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
        memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
    }
}

ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.  A new
ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY.

When the packet is received we get the security context from the
sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the
ancillary message space.  An additional LSM hook,
selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security
context from the SELinux space.  The existing function,
selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the
security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to
kernel space.

Testing:

We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between
applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in
labeled security associations being built.  For TCP, we can then
extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end.  For
UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the
auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: NCatherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      2c7946a7
  37. 12 1月, 2006 1 次提交
  39. 04 1月, 2006 2 次提交
  41. 09 11月, 2005 1 次提交
  43. 30 8月, 2005 3 次提交
  45. 06 8月, 2005 1 次提交