/* ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # include #endif static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s); static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s); static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s); static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b); static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p); /* * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not? * * Return values are: * 1: Yes * 0: No */ static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s) { /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) return 0; return 1; } /* * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not? * * Return values are: * 1: Yes * 0: No * -1: Error */ static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s) { long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral * ciphersuite or for SRP */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kSRP)) { return 1; } /* * Export ciphersuites may have temporary RSA keys if the public key in the * server certificate is longer than the maximum export strength */ if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); if (pkey == NULL) return -1; /* * If the public key in the certificate is shorter than or equal to the * maximum export strength then a temporary RSA key is not allowed */ if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) return 0; EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return 1; } return 0; } /* * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. * * Return values are: * 1: Success (transition allowed) * 0: Error (transition not allowed) */ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ske_expected; switch(st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; return 1; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; return 1; } } break; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: if (s->hit) { if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; return 1; } } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; } } else { if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; return 1; } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; return 1; } } else { ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); if (ske_expected < 0) return 0; /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; return 1; } } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST && cert_req_allowed(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; return 1; } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; return 1; } } } break; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS; return 1; } return 0; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); if (ske_expected < 0) return 0; /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; return 1; } return 0; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { if (cert_req_allowed(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; return 1; } return 0; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET && s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; return 1; } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; return 1; } break; default: break; } /* No valid transition found */ return 0; } /* * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server. */ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch(st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_OK: /* Renegotiation - fall through */ case TLS_ST_BEFORE: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: /* * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what * we will be sent */ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: /* * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is * sent, but no verify packet is sent */ /* * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate. */ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY; } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; } if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; } return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; #else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; #endif return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; #endif case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: if (s->hit) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } else { return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; } case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: if (s->hit) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } default: /* Shouldn't happen */ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; } } /* * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from * the client to the server. */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch(st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: s->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); } break; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst); case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (s->hit) { /* * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these * messages unless we need to. */ st->use_timer = 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); #endif } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_OK: return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst); default: /* No pre work to be done */ break; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the * client to the server. */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; s->init_num = 0; switch(st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->d1->cookie_len > 0 && statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Disable buffering for SCTP */ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { #endif /* * turn on buffering for the next lot of output */ if (s->bbio != s->wbio) s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP } #endif if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* Treat the next message as the first packet */ s->first_packet = 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) return WORK_ERROR; break; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP s->session->compress_meth = 0; #else if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) s->session->compress_meth = 0; else s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return WORK_ERROR; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) return WORK_ERROR; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (s->hit) { /* * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if * no SCTP used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL); } #endif dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); } break; case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) { /* * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if * no SCTP used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL); } #endif if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_B; break; default: /* No post work to be done */ break; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server. * * Valid return values are: * 1: Success * 0: Error */ int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch(st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: return tls_construct_client_hello(s); case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: return tls_construct_client_certificate(s); case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s); case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: return tls_construct_client_verify(s); case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s); else return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: return tls_construct_next_proto(s); #endif case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: return tls_construct_finished(s, s->method-> ssl3_enc->client_finished_label, s->method-> ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len); default: /* Shouldn't happen */ break; } return 0; } /* * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are * reading. Excludes the message header. */ unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch(st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: return s->max_cert_list; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; default: /* Shouldn't happen */ break; } return 0; } /* * Process a message that the client has been received from the server. */ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch(st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt); case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); default: /* Shouldn't happen */ break; } return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message * from the server */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch(st->hand_state) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */ if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1); return WORK_MORE_A; } ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0); return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; #endif default: break; } /* Shouldn't happen */ return WORK_ERROR; } /* * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. * Returns 1 on success * Returns 0 on error */ static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s) { unsigned long mask, options = s->options; if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) { /* * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3. */ mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 #endif ; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT) if (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) { if ((options & mask) != mask) { s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION; } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); return 0; } } else { s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION; } #else if ((options & mask) == mask) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); return 0; } s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION; #endif mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask) s->version = TLS1_VERSION; mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask) s->version = SSL3_VERSION; #endif if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); return 0; } if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && FIPS_mode()) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); return 0; } } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { /* Determine which DTLS version to use */ /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */ if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) { if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); return 0; } /* * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error. */ if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); return 0; } /* * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features. */ s->method = DTLSv1_client_method(); s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; } else { /* * We only support one version: update method */ if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; } } s->client_version = s->version; return 1; } int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p, *d; int i; unsigned long l; int al = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int j; SSL_COMP *comp; #endif SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */ if (ssl_set_version(s) == 0) goto err; if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) || /* * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared * "ticket" without a session ID. */ (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || (sess->not_resumable)) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) goto err; } /* else use the pre-loaded session */ p = s->s3->client_random; /* * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { size_t idx; i = 1; for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) { if (p[idx]) { i = 0; break; } } } else i = 1; if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0) goto err; /* Do the message type and length last */ d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); /*- * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can * choke if we initially report a higher version then * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports * 1.0. * * Possible scenario with previous logic: * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now * know that is maximum server supports. * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret * containing version 1.0. * * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to * the negotiated version. */ *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8; *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff; /* Random stuff */ memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* Session ID */ if (s->new_session) i = 0; else i = s->session->session_id_length; *(p++) = i; if (i != 0) { if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i); p += i; } /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len; memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); p += s->d1->cookie_len; } /* Ciphers supported */ i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2])); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); goto err; } #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH /* * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we * use TLS v1.2 */ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH) i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; #endif s2n(i, p); p += i; /* COMPRESSION */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP *(p++) = 1; #else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods) j = 0; else j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); *(p++) = 1 + j; for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); *(p++) = comp->id; } #endif *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */ /* TLS extensions */ if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } l = p - d; if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } return 1; err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al; unsigned int cookie_len; PACKET cookiepkt; if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt); if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len; return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; const SSL_CIPHER *c; PACKET session_id; size_t session_id_len; unsigned char *cipherchars; int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; unsigned int compression; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP SSL_COMP *comp; #endif if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) { unsigned int sversion; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION #error Code needs updating for new TLS version #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 if ((sversion == SSL3_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) { if (FIPS_mode()) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } s->method = SSLv3_client_method(); } else #endif if ((sversion == TLS1_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) { s->method = TLSv1_client_method(); } else if ((sversion == TLS1_1_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) { s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method(); } else if ((sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) { s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method(); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version; if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW); al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { /* Work out correct protocol version to use */ unsigned int hversion; int options; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &hversion)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } options = s->options; if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); s->version = hversion; al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) s->method = DTLSv1_client_method(); else { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); s->version = hversion; al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version; } else { unsigned char *vers; if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &vers, 2)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if ((vers[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (vers[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | vers[1]; al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } } /* load the server hello data */ /* load the server random */ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } s->hit = 0; /* Get the session-id. */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id); if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } /* * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret. * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the * server wants to resume. */ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb && s->session->tlsext_tick) { SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, NULL, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } } if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id, session_id_len) == 0) { if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { /* actually a client application bug */ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); goto f_err; } s->hit = 1; } else { /* * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION. * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID, * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. */ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { goto f_err; } } s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; /* session_id_len could be 0 */ memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), session_id_len); } c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars); if (c == NULL) { /* unknown cipher */ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */ if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; else s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0; /* Skip TLS v1.0 ciphersuites if SSLv3 */ if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1) && s->version == SSL3_VERSION) s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1; /* * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so * return an error. */ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); if (i < 0) { /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is * set and use it for comparison. */ if (s->session->cipher) s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; /* * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client * authentication. */ if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) goto f_err; /* lets get the compression algorithm */ /* COMPRESSION */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (compression != 0) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto f_err; } /* * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session * using compression. */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); goto f_err; } #else if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); goto f_err; } if (compression == 0) comp = NULL; else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); goto f_err; } else { comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression); } if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto f_err; } else { s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; } #endif /* TLS extensions */ if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); goto err; } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { /* wrong packet length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; /* * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if * no SCTP used. */ memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) goto err; BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); } #endif return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx; unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len; X509 *x = NULL; unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } certstart = certbytes; x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len); if (x == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto f_err; } if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } x = NULL; } i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); goto f_err; } ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ if (i > 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i); al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } s->session->peer_chain = sk; /* * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate, * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */ x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); sk = NULL; /* * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end */ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { x = NULL; al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey); if (i < 0) { x = NULL; al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); goto f_err; } exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) { x = NULL; al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); goto f_err; } s->session->peer_type = i; X509_free(s->session->peer); X509_up_ref(x); s->session->peer = x; s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; x = NULL; ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; goto done; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); done: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); return ret; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; #endif EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; int al, j, verify_ret; long alg_k, alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; int curve_nid = 0; #endif PACKET save_param_start, signature; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; save_param_start = *pkt; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA_free(s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp); s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH_free(s->s3->peer_dh_tmp); s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EC_KEY_free(s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp); s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL; #endif alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */ if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { PACKET psk_identity_hint; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK * identity. */ if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) { OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint, &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } } /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if ((s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL || (s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL || (s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt), PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL || (s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub), PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } /* We must check if there is a certificate */ if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS)) pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { PACKET mod, exp; /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */ if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &mod) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exp)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if ((rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&mod), PACKET_remaining(&mod), rsa->n)) == NULL || (rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&exp), PACKET_remaining(&exp), rsa->e)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */ if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); else { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa; rsa = NULL; } #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ if (0) ; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { PACKET prime, generator, pub_key; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL || (dh->g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL || (dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (BN_is_zero(dh->p) || BN_is_zero(dh->g) || BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); goto f_err; } if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); goto f_err; } if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS)) pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = dh; dh = NULL; } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { EC_GROUP *ngroup; const EC_GROUP *group; PACKET encoded_pt; unsigned char *ecparams; if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. */ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } /* * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes. */ if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); goto f_err; } if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2))) == 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid); if (ngroup == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } EC_GROUP_free(ngroup); group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); goto f_err; } /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */ if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) || ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), bn_ctx) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); goto f_err; } /* * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA * and ECDSA. */ if (0) ; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); # endif /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint); s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh; ecdh = NULL; BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx = NULL; EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); srvr_ecpoint = NULL; } else if (alg_k) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* if it was signed, check the signature */ if (pkey != NULL) { PACKET params; /* * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference * equals the length of the parameters. */ if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms, PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) - PACKET_remaining(pkt))) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { unsigned char *sigalgs; int rv; if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey); if (rv == -1) goto err; else if (rv == 0) { goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif } else { md = EVP_sha1(); } if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if (j < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } /* * Check signature length */ if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)j) { /* wrong packet length */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { int num; unsigned int size; j = 0; q = md_buf; for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms), PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } q += size; j += size; } verify_ret = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, PACKET_data(&signature), PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey->pkey.rsa); if (verify_ret < 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); goto f_err; } if (verify_ret == 0) { /* bad signature */ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif { if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms), PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto f_err; } if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } } else { /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */ if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) { /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* still data left over */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } } EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA_free(rsa); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH_free(dh); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); EC_KEY_free(ecdh); #endif EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; unsigned char *data; unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* get the certificate types */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes); s->cert->ctypes = NULL; if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) { /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */ s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num); if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num); s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num; ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER; } for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++) s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i]; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL; s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; } if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); goto err; } if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } /* get the CA RDNs */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } namestart = namebytes; if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1; s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num; sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk; ca_sk = NULL; ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; goto done; err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); done: sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); return ret; } static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b)); } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al; unsigned int ticklen; unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint; if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */ if (ticklen == 0) return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; SSL_SESSION *new_sess; /* * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new * one */ if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) { /* * Remove the old session from the cache */ if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) { if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx, s->session); } else { /* We carry on if this fails */ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); } } if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = new_sess; } OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick); s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0; s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; /* * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption. * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket. */ EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen, s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, EVP_sha256(), NULL); return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al; unsigned long resplen; unsigned int type; if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type) || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { int ret; ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); if (ret == 0) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); goto f_err; } if (ret < 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { /* should contain no data */ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } #endif /* * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from * the server */ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Only applies to renegotiation */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) && s->renegotiate != 0) return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; else #endif return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; int n; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK size_t pskhdrlen = 0; #endif unsigned long alg_k; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL; const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; int encoded_pt_len = 0; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif unsigned char *pms = NULL; size_t pmslen = 0; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; p = ssl_handshake_start(s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { int psk_err = 1; /* * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating * strnlen. */ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; size_t identitylen; unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; size_t psklen; if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); goto err; } memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint, identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, psk, sizeof(psk)); if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto psk_err; } else if (psklen == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); goto psk_err; } OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen); OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); goto memerr; } s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; identitylen = strlen(identity); if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto psk_err; } OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); goto memerr; } s2n(identitylen, p); memcpy(p, identity, identitylen); pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen; p += identitylen; psk_err = 0; psk_err: OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); if (psk_err != 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { n = 0; } else #endif /* Fool emacs indentation */ if (0) { } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { RSA *rsa; pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); if (pms == NULL) goto memerr; if (s->session->peer == NULL) { /* * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) rsa = s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp; else { pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); goto err; } rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); } pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0) goto err; q = p; /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) p += 2; n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); # ifdef PKCS1_CHECK if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++; if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0] = 0x70; # endif if (n <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); goto err; } /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { s2n(n, q); n += 2; } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt; if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) dh_srvr = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp; else { /* we get them from the cert */ EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL; dh_srvr = NULL; spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); if (spkey) { dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey); EVP_PKEY_free(spkey); } if (dh_srvr == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { /* Use client certificate key */ EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; dh_clnt = NULL; if (clkey) dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey); if (dh_clnt == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } else { /* generate a new random key */ if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); DH_free(dh_clnt); goto err; } } pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt); pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); if (pms == NULL) goto memerr; /* * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to * clear it out afterwards */ n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt); if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp == NULL) DH_free(dh_srvr); if (n <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); DH_free(dh_clnt); goto err; } pmslen = n; if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) n = 0; else { /* send off the data */ n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key); s2n(n, p); BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p); n += 2; } DH_free(dh_clnt); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL; EC_KEY *tkey; int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0; int field_size = 0; /* * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. */ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) { /*- * XXX: For now, we do not support client * authentication using ECDH certificates. * To add such support, one needs to add * code that checks for appropriate * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. * For example, the cert have an ECC * key on the same curve as the server's * and the key should be authorized for * key agreement. * * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect * to skip sending the certificate verify * message. * * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) && * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type == * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...) * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1; */ } if (s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) { tkey = s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp; } else { /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */ srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec; } srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey); if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { /* * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our * private key to perform the ECDH computation. */ const BIGNUM *priv_key; tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec; priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); if (priv_key == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } else { /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */ if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } } /* * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to * clear it out afterwards */ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group); if (field_size <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8; pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); if (pms == NULL) goto memerr; n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL); if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { /* Send empty client key exch message */ n = 0; } else { /* * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory * accordingly. */ encoded_pt_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Encode the public key */ n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx); *p = n; /* length of encoded point */ /* Encoded point will be copied here */ p += 1; /* copy the point */ memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n); /* increment n to account for length field */ n += 1; } /* Free allocated memory */ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { /* GOST key exchange message creation */ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; X509 *peer_cert; size_t msglen; unsigned int md_len; unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash; EVP_PKEY *pub_key; pmslen = 32; pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); if (pms == NULL) goto memerr; /* * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */ peer_cert = s->session->peer; if (!peer_cert) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); goto err; } pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key = X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL); if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key * parameters match those of server certificate, use * certificate key for key exchange */ /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ if (pkey_ctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 /* Generate session key */ || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; }; /* * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) { if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) { /* * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key * * would be used */ ERR_clear_error(); } } /* * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context * data */ ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ /* * Encapsulate it into sequence */ *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; msglen = 255; if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } if (msglen >= 0x80) { *(p++) = 0x81; *(p++) = msglen & 0xff; n = msglen + 3; } else { *(p++) = msglen & 0xff; n = msglen + 2; } memcpy(p, tmp, msglen); /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) { /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) { /* send off the data */ n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A); s2n(n, p); BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p); n += 2; } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } #endif else { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK n += pskhdrlen; #endif if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; return 1; memerr: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; #endif ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) { unsigned char *pms = NULL; size_t pmslen = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* Check for SRP */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } return 1; } #endif pms = s->s3->tmp.pms; pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen; if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; /* * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP * used. */ memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) goto err; BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); } #endif return 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; return 0; } int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; EVP_PKEY *pkey; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX mctx; unsigned u = 0; unsigned long n; int j; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); p = ssl_handshake_start(s); pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); if (pctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) { if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, &(data [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); } else { ERR_clear_error(); } /* * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed * digest and cached handshake records. */ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { long hdatalen = 0; void *hdata; const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys]; hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } p += 2; #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } s2n(u, p); n = u + 4; /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) goto err; } else #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0])); if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); goto err; } s2n(u, p); n = u + 2; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type, &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB); goto err; } s2n(j, p); n = j + 2; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type, &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB); goto err; } s2n(j, p); n = j + 2; } else #endif if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { unsigned char signbuf[64]; int i; size_t sigsize = 64; s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_id_GostR3411_94, data); if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) { p[2 + j] = signbuf[i]; } s2n(j, p); n = j + 2; } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return 0; } /* * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B. */ static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) { unsigned long alg_k; if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey) return 0; /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys]) return 0; /* * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also * adjusts suite B digest if necessary. */ if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2)) return 0; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { int i = s->session->peer_type; EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL; clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */ if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH) return 1; if (i >= 0) spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); if (spkey) { /* Compare server and client parameters */ i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey); EVP_PKEY_free(spkey); if (i != 1) return 0; } s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; } return 1; } WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { X509 *x509 = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int i; if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ if (s->cert->cert_cb) { i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); if (i < 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return WORK_MORE_A; } if (i == 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; } if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */ wst = WORK_MORE_B; } /* We need to get a client cert */ if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { /* * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; * return(-1); We then get retied later */ i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); if (i < 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return WORK_MORE_B; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) i = 0; } else if (i == 1) { i = 0; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); } X509_free(x509); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) i = 0; if (i == 0) { if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } else { s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2; if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } } } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* Shouldn't ever get here */ return WORK_ERROR; } int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s) { if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } return 1; } #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m)) int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) { int i, idx; long alg_k, alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int pkey_bits; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh; #endif int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; /* we don't have a certificate */ if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) return (1); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA rsa = s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dh = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp; #endif /* This is the passed certificate */ idx = s->session->peer_type; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) { if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) { /* check failed */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); goto f_err; } else { return 1; } } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT); goto f_err; } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT); goto f_err; } #endif pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */ if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT); goto f_err; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); goto f_err; } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); goto f_err; } if (rsa != NULL) { /* server key exchange is not allowed. */ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } } } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (dh == NULL)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT); goto f_err; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT); goto f_err; } # endif #endif if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { if (rsa == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } else if (RSA_bits(rsa) > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */ al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { if (DH_bits(dh) > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */ al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */ al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } else #endif { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } } return (1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return (0); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s) { unsigned int len, padding_len; unsigned char *d; len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; d[4] = len; memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); d[5 + len] = padding_len; memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len); *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d); s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len; s->init_off = 0; return 1; } #endif int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) { int i = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) { i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s, SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (i != 0) return i; } #endif if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); return i; } int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p) { int i, j = 0; SSL_CIPHER *c; unsigned char *q; int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate; /* Set disabled masks for this session */ ssl_set_client_disabled(s); if (sk == NULL) return (0); q = p; for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); /* Skip disabled ciphers */ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED)) continue; #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv) continue; else empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0; } #endif j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p); p += j; } /* * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add * applicable SCSVs. */ if (p != q) { if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) { static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p); p += j; #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n"); #endif } if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p); p += j; } } return (p - q); }